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Abstract
This paper investigates how the general public behaves when confronted with low
probability events and ambiguity in an insurance context. It reports the results of
a questionnaire completed by a large representative sample of the French population
that aims at separating attitudes toward risk, imprecision and conﬂict and at deter-
mining if there is a demand for ambiguous and extreme event risks. The data show
a strong distinction between two aspects of the problem: the decision of purchasing
insurance and the willingness to pay. In the decision to insure, more than 25% of the
respondents refuse to buy insurance and people are more willing to insure in a risky
situation than in an ambiguous one. This certain taste for risk can be explained by
the respondents' observable characteristics. In addition, it highlights a lack of conﬁ-
dence in the insurance markets. When it comes to willingness to pay, people exhibit
ambiguity seeking behaviors. They are willing to pay more under risk than under
ambiguity (embracing here imprecision and conﬂict), revealing that people consider
ambiguous situations as inferior. Furthermore, respondents behave diﬀerently under
imprecision and conﬂict. They exhibit a preference for consensual information and
dislike conﬂicts. However, the willingness to pay is poorly correlated with observable
characteristics.
Keywords: Ambiguity, imprecision, conﬂict, decision making, extreme risk, insu-
rance demand, willingness to pay.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C93, D81, D83, Q54.
Résumé
Ce papier vise à comprendre les comportements d'assurance du grand public face
à l'ambiguïté et aux risques de faible probabilité. A travers un questionnaire com-
plété par un large échantillon représentatif de la population française, l'objectif est
d'identiﬁer les attitudes vis-à-vis du risque, de l'imprécision et du conﬂit et de déter-
miner la demande d'assurance pour des risques extrêmes et ambigus. Les résultats
montrent deux décisions distinctes : la décision d'acheter de l'assurance et la décision
du consentement maximal à payer. Dans la première décision, plus de 25% des sujets
refusent de s'assurer et les individus sont plus enclins à s'assurer en présence de risque
que d'ambiguïté. Ce goût pour le risque s'explique en partie par les caractéristiques
des individus, et révèle un manque de conﬁance dans le marché de l'assurance. En ce
qui concerne la seconde décision, les individus ont un goût pour l'ambiguïté (incluant
l'imprécision et le conﬂit). Ils considèrent les situations ambiguës comme inférieures
et sont moins prêts à payer. En outre, les individus se comportent diﬀéremment dans
l'imprécision et dans le conﬂit. Ils préfèrent lorsque l'information est consensuelle et
n'aiment pas les conﬂits. Cependant, les consentements à payer ne sont pas corrélés
avec les caractéristiques observables.
Mots-clés: Ambiguïté, imprécision, conﬂit, prise de décision, risque extrême, de-
mande d?assurance, consentement à payer.
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1 Introduction
The assessment of the risk characteristics, i.e. the faculty of correctly evaluating the po-
tential losses and the associated occurrence probability, is an important condition of the
insurability of a risk because it allows the use of actuarial methods for pricing insurance
contracts. However, our societies are confronted with risks which do not verify this con-
dition, as is the case for extreme events, like natural hazards, environmental pollution or
new technologies. The magnitude of the occurrence probability of the event is diﬃcult
to estimate, especially due to the non-availability of historical records, changing environ-
ments and new regulations. On the insurance markets, insurers have to incorporate this
uncertainty in the premium estimation, but the demand can respond diﬀerently, and the
way insureds will react to extreme events could cause disruption to insurance markets.
The decisions concerning these events are not taken in a risky environment where it
is possible to deﬁne precise probabilities for the events, but in an uncertain environment
where the information is not complete, namely an ambiguous situation. The subjective
expected utility theory (Savage 1954) allows to treat a decision under ambiguity as a de-
cision under risk, with a subjective probability distribution replacing the objective one
(known in the precise environment). However, many works have shown that the notions
of risk and ambiguity are treated diﬀerently (Ellsberg, 1961). This distinction has led to
the separation between risk and ambiguity aversions. Furthermore, people seem to behave
diﬀerently according to the source of ambiguity, separating here attitudes toward impreci-
sion and conﬂict. Imprecision refers to a situation in which the information is consensual
but imprecise; and conﬂict refers to a situation of disagreement between experts. Smithson
(1999) deﬁne conﬂict aversion as the fact that individuals prefer a consensual information
over a controversial one. He explains that conﬂicts are perceived as less credible and trust-
worthy. This paper intends to understand decisions regarding the insurance demand for
extreme events coping with risky, imprecise and conﬂicting situations.
Insurance markets represent a promising context for empirical studies as the decisions
deal with risk estimation. Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) highlight an insurance context
eﬀect, risk aversion being stronger in a real environment rather than in non-contextual
lotteries. In addition, extreme risks lead to diﬀerent behaviors than more common risks.
Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) observe an overestimation of low-probabilities and an un-
derestimation of large-probabilities, revealing that fair insurance should be more attractive
for low probability risks, which is consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect
theory. However, individuals prefer purchasing insurance for large-probability small-loss
events, rather than low-probability high-loss events (Slovic et al, 1977). The possibility of
learning over time being limited, the occurrence probability estimation cannot always be
adjusted. Individuals have a short term vision and prefer taking protection against most
likely losses. Actually, bimodal behaviors are found in other empirical studies (Kunreuther,
1978; McClelland et al, 1993; Schade et al, 2004), revealing that people are either scared
of extreme risks and pay a premium well in excess of the expected loss, or ignore them
completely and do not insure. An explanation could be that individuals appreciate the like-
lihood of rare events contingent to their past experience (Kahneman et al, 1982). Then,
insurance decisions do not only lean upon the need for protection through an arbitrage
between the costs and beneﬁts, and observable characteristics can help understand the
underlying factors.
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Furthermore, insurance decisions also vary in presence of ambiguity. When adding am-
biguity, Schade et al (2004) observe a higher number of people willing to insure and large
ambiguity aversion in the willingness to pay. Hogarth and Kunreuther (1985) ﬁnd am-
biguity aversion for low-probability events, but ambiguity preference for large-probability
events. In a similar fashion, Kunreuther et al (1993) reveal that insurers also exhibit
ambiguity aversion and demand a higher premium when the probability is ambiguous.
However, these papers include ambiguity through comments explaining the uncertain situ-
ation around a best estimate, the ambiguity source is not deﬁned. Di Mauro and Maﬃoletti
(2001) study the impact of diﬀerent deﬁnitions of ambiguity on the willingness to buy in-
surance. They distinguish the best estimate1, the interval of probability, and the set of
probability; but they do not notice major diﬀerences between the three representations
(and they do not cope with extreme events). Cabantous (2007) and Cabantous et al
(2011) reveal that insurers are sensitive to the ambiguity source. They test for imprecision
aversion (Ellsberg, 1961) characterised by a consensual information that the true value
of the probability ranges within an interval, and for conﬂict aversion (Smithson, 1999)
when multiple sources of information lead to a disagreement on the value of the proba-
bility. They ﬁnd that insurers exhibit stronger conﬂict aversion than ambiguity aversion,
i.e. insurers dislike conﬂicting information and prefer consensual information. In addition,
insurers seem to be slightly risk averse but highly ambiguity averse. These papers study
non-contextual lotteries or insurance supply, but it seems that there is no paper analyzing
insurance demand, especially of the general public, dealing with imprecision and conﬂict.
The analysis of insurance demand behaviors allows to compare the results for both
sides of the market (insureds and insurers). Indeed, in a free market, supply has to meet
demand. If the insurers only accept a very high premium for extreme risks under ambi-
guity (Cabantous et al, 2011), is there a demand for coverage for these same risks ? People
might not be as ambiguity averse, and therefore a market does not necessarily exist. How
does the insurance demand for ambiguous risks stand in comparison to insurance demand
for well-known risks? Is it possible to explain the insurance demand from the risk charac-
teristics and the socio-demographic factors ? How do individuals perceive imprecise and
conﬂicting situations in extreme event risks ? This paper aims at producing new results on
risk and ambiguity perceptions in relation with individual observable characteristics. The
main objective is to reveal insurance demand behaviors, separating the attitudes toward
risk, imprecision and conﬂict; and to ﬁnd a set of determinants for these behaviors, based
on socio-demographic characteristics. This paper is part of a larger project including the
behavioral study of insurance professionals in order to provide new insights on the insu-
rance markets of extreme and ambiguous risks.
A questionnaire was administered to a large representative sample of the French popu-
lation in order to put in relation insurance demand with socio-demographic characteristics.
The ﬁnal sample replicates the structure of the French population based on quotas from
the last census report. Respondents had to give their willingness to pay for an insurance
contract covering a low-probability risk and under a speciﬁc information type (risk, im-
precision or conﬂict). Imprecision, here, refers to a situation in which the information
is imprecise and consensual (experts agree on a vague estimate); and conﬂict refers to a
situation in which the information is precise and controversial (experts disagree but each
have a precise estimate). Subjects had the choice between buying insurance and revealing
their maximum insurance premium, and not buying insurance and risking the loss.
1The subjects were provided with a probability and were told that this was the best estimate available.
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The main results were as follows. Firstly, the decision to insure and the decision of the
insurance premium portray two diﬀerent actions with speciﬁc determinants. In particular,
25% of the respondents refuse to buy insurance and that decision can be explained by the
age, the education level, the insurance claims and the past experience linked to extreme
events. Secondly, risk and ambiguity lead to diﬀerent behaviors. The results show that
people are more willing to buy insurance and to pay a higher premium in the presence of
risk than in the presence of ambiguity. They exhibit ambiguity seeking behaviors, because
they consider ambiguous situations as being inferior. Furthermore, people show a lack of
conﬁdence in the insurance markets, they have doubts about the reimbursements in case
of a loss event. Thirdly, respondents exhibit conﬂict aversion. They would pay a higher
premium under conﬂict than under imprecision, which reveals a preference for consensual
information.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section summarizes the main points
of the literature on decision making under ambiguity from a theoretical point of view.
The third section introduces the predictions and the experimental design of the survey.
The fourth section presents the survey results, divided between the insurance decision per
se and the willingness to pay. In concluding, the paper discusses the results and raises
questions for further research.
2 Insurance demand under risk and ambiguity: some theo-
retical background
The expected utility model has long been the main model for preferences representation
under risk. It has been extended in the subjective expected utility (SEU) model proposed
by Savage (1954), which allows to model a decision under ambiguity as a decision under
risk, with a subjective probability distribution replacing the objective one. It assumes that
each decision maker is able to have a precise idea of the probability distribution, even if it
is subjective. However, the axioms are not always veriﬁed (Ellsberg, 1963), and the SEU
model is not able to separate risk and ambiguity attitudes. Therefore, several models have
been proposed to represent the preferences according to the available information.
In this part, we give some basic results on the willingness to pay for full coverage under
three diﬀerent information types (risk, imprecision and conﬂict) in a simple, two-states of
nature insurance problem. Consider an individual with an initial wealth w who faces a risk
of loss l. S = {L;L} is the state space with L = {Loss} and L = {No loss}. The outcome
space X represents money and a decision is a couple (a; b) where a is the individual's
wealth if a loss occurs and b if no loss occurs. Then, two main decisions can be made :
• The decision maker can decide not to buy insurance : f = (w − l;w). The outcome
of decision f depends on the probability distribution of loss between the two states.
• The decision maker can decide to buy full insurance at a premium pi : g = (w −
pi;w − pi). The outcome of decision g is not impacted by the states of nature.
The individual evaluates decisions based on their preferences and beliefs of the risk
characteristics. Let V be the value attached to these decisions. Then, the decision maker
will prefer a decision over another by comparing V (f) and V (g). We will contemplate
diﬀerent functional forms for V . For all of them the decision g, which entails no exposure
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to any uncertainty, will be evaluated by V (g) = u(w − pi), where u : X −→ R is a
monotonic, increasing and concave utility function over outcomes. Furthermore, we are
interested here in the maximum premium the individual is willing to pay for full coverage,
i.e. the premium which makes one indiﬀerent between buying and not buying insurance:
pi such that V (f) = V (g).
2.1 Insurance decision for well-estimated risk
In situations of precise risk, the decision maker has enough information to precisely estimate
the probability distribution (p ; 1 − p), where p is the probability of state L and (1 − p)
the probability of state L. With SEU preferences, the value of decision f is:
VSEU (f) = pu(w − l) + (1− p)u(w)
The willingness to pay pi for full coverage is the solution of u(w−pi) = pu(w−l)+(1−p)u(w).
If the utility function is concave, reﬂecting diminishing marginal utility and risk aversion
under SEU , then, from Jensen's inequality, we have :
u(w − pl) > pu(w − l) + (1− p)u(w)⇔ pi > pl
Therefore, for risk averse individuals, the maximum premium they are willing to pay is
strictly higher than the expected loss (pl). Furthermore, there exists only one pi that
maximizes u(w − pi) = VSEU (f) (Mossin, 1968). With SEU preferences and concave u:
piSEU ∈ ] pl ; l ]. For risk neutral individuals (u is linear), the willingness to pay is the
expected loss (pi = pl).
2.2 Insurance decision under ambiguity
In situations of ambiguous risk, the decision maker has an imprecise knowledge of the pro-
bability distribution. The information is deﬁned as a set P of probability distributions in
which lies the true probability. In our insurance problem, P = {(p; 1−p)|p ∈ [pmin; pmax]},
the decision maker only knows that the probability of loss ranges between pmin and pmax.
The actuarial expected probability is equal to p = 12(pmin + pmax). In this way, the deci-
sions under ambiguity can be compared with the decisions under risk.
Several models have been proposed in order to model ambiguous situations. In parti-
cular, the maxmin expected utility (MaxMinEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
considers that the decision maker evaluates a decision by computing its minimal expected
utility on a subjective space state. For a decision f :
VMaxMinEU (f) = Min
p∈P
Epu(f)
With MaxMinEU preferences, our decision maker will only take into account the worst
probability distribution, i.e. the highest loss probability: VMaxMinEU (f) = pmaxu(w− l)+
(1 − pmax)u(w). Then, VSEU > VMaxMinEU , a risky situation is always preferred to an
imprecise one when p is the center of the interval [pmin; pmax]. Furthermore, in terms of
willingness to pay, pi is the solution of u(w−pi) = VMaxMinEU (f). A risk averse individual
will have a maximum premium of piSEU > pmaxl. A risk neutral individual will be willing
to pay exactly pmaxl.
The alpha maxmin expected utility model (αMaxMinEU) of Ghirardato et al (2004)
allows to generalize the MaxMinEU model in taking into account both the minimal and
6
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the maximal expected utility2. In addition, the model with second order beliefs (Klibanoﬀ
et al, 2005) assumes that the individual has a set of beliefs over P that measures how much
they weight the possibility of p ∈ P being the correct value3.
However, in our insurance context, the information is imprecise but objective. If we
assume the set P of MaxMinEU to be objective information, the decision maker exhibit
extreme ambiguity aversion. It is more appropriate to use a model that captures objective
imprecise information (Gajdos et al, 2008). In our special case with only two states of
nature, this model is similar to αMaxMin. Gajdos et al (2008) (GHTV ) represent prefe-
rences in taking a convex combination of the minimum expected utility with respect to all
P , and the expected utility with respect to a precise p in P . Therefore, a decision f can
be evaluated as follows:
VGHTV (f) = αMin
p∈P
Epu(f) + (1− α)Epu(f)
where α represents the attitude towards imprecise information., and p = 12(pmin + pmax)
is the actuarial expected loss. Then, the decision f is computed as:
VGHTV (f) = α[pmaxu(w − l) + (1− pmax)u(w)] + (1− α)[pu(w − l) + (1− p)u(w)]
In terms of willingness to pay, pi is the solution of u(w − pi) = VGHTV (f), and we ﬁnd a
maximum insurance premium of:
piGHTV >
(
αpmax + (1− α)pmin + pmax
2
)
l
Therefore, if α > 0, the individual lends more weight on pmax: the premium is higher in
an imprecise situation than in a precise one, which denotes ambiguity aversion: VSEU >
VGHTV and piSEU < piGHTV . If α = 1, it is an extreme case where the decision maker only
takes into account the worst case. If α = 0, we get back to an SEU representation.
2.3 Insurance decision under conﬂict
Conﬂict occurs when several experts are consulted to estimate the probability distribution,
but they disagree and each give their own estimate. Gajdos and Vergnaud (2009) have
formalized decisions with conﬂicting information. They suppose that people exhibit conﬂict
aversion, i.e. that they always prefer an imprecise situation over a conﬂicting one, they
prefer information that is consensual and dislike when it is controversial. Furthermore, they
prefer when the experts have opinions that are not too diﬀerent from one another. Lets
consider a decision maker facing conﬂict from two diﬀerent experts giving respectively a set
of probability distributions P and Q. Gajdos and Vergnaud (2009) represent preferences
as follows:
VGV (f) = Min
γ∈Γ
[
γ
(
Min
p∈φ(P )
Epu(f)
)
+ (1− γ)
(
Min
p∈φ(Q)
Epu(f)
)]
with Γ =
{
(1− λ) (12 ; 12) + λ(t; 1− t) | t ∈ [0; 1]}
2With αMaxMinEU preferences, VαMaxMinEU (f) = α[pmaxu(w − l) + (1 − pmax)u(w)] + (1 −
α)[pminu(w − l) + (1− pmin)u(w)], and therefore the maximum insurance premium the decision maker is
willing to pay is pi > [αpmax + (1− α)pmin]l, where α represents the attitude towards ambiguity
3If the decision maker has a set of beliefs qi over P : For qi ∈ [0; 1] and pi ∈ [pmin; pmax], V2OB(f) =∑
qi
qiΦ(
∑
pi
(piu(w − l) + (1− pi)u(w))) and V2OB(g) = Φ(u(w − pi)). Therefore, pi > [∑
qi
∑
pi
qipi]l.
7
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φ is a linear mapping representing the subjective treatment of the information, Γ is a
symmetric closed and convex subset that represents the attitude toward conﬂict, and λ
(λ ∈ [0; 1]) can be interpreted as a measure of conﬂict aversion. This model allows to take
into account both attitudes toward imprecision and conﬂict, and can be read in two steps.
First, the decision maker evaluates experts' assessment via φ and comes up with a belief
for each assessments. Second, the evaluations are aggregated via the set Γ.
In our insurance context with conﬂict, let consider that one expert says that the loss
probability is pmin, and the other says it is pmax. There is no imprecise information, i.e.
P and Q are singletons respectively equal to pmax and pmin. Then, we only minimize on
Γ, and the value of decision f can be written as:
VGV (f) = (1− λ)
[
1
2EPu(f) +
1
2EQu(f)
]
+ λMin
t∈[0;1]
[tEPu(f) + (1− t)EQu(f)]
= Min
t∈[0;1]
[(
1
2(1− λ) + λt)
)
EPu(f) +
(
1
2(1− λ) + λ(1− t)
)
EQu(f)
]
where EPu(f) = pmaxu(w−l)+(1−pmax)u(w) and EQu(f) = pminu(w−l)+(1−pmin)u(w).
The willingness to pay is the solution of u(w − pi) = VGV (f), that is:
piGV >
(
λpmax + (1− λ)pmin + pmax
2
)
l
λ captures the attitude toward the experts' disagreement. Indeed, it reﬂects an arbitrage
between the actuarial expected loss, which gives the same weight to both possible values
of p and then do not diﬀerentiate the experts; and pmax, which allows to diﬀerentiate one
expert over another.
According to these models of risk, imprecision and conﬂict, the decision maker should
always prefer a precise situation over an imprecise one. Furthermore, they should always
prefer an imprecise situation over a conﬂicting one. Therefore, in our survey, the maximum
premium the individuals are willing to pay should be the lowest in presence of risk, and it
should increase with imprecision and even more with conﬂict.
3 Predictions and experimental design
3.1 Main predictions
The literature on decision making on insurance of extreme events brings to light that
individuals behave diﬀerently in the presence of risk, imprecision and conﬂict, that they
face diﬃculties in interpreting small probabilities and do not only reason based on the
expected value. Insurance decisions are not yet entirely understood and it is interesting to
analyze them by means of a large distributed survey. Considering the eﬀects of ambiguity
on insurance decisions dealing with extreme event risks is an important step in the con-
ception of insurance and prevention strategies dealing with these risks.
This paper reports a survey administered to a large representative sample of the French
population. Respondents were asked to give the maximum premium they are willing to pay
to purchase an insurance contract against a speciﬁc low-probability risk. Our main goal is
to determine whether there is an insurance demand for ambiguous extreme risks and how
the willingness to pay is related to the observable characteristics of the respondents. Let
consider the following set of hypotheses, consistent with the theoretical literature.
8
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H1: Individuals exhibit risk aversion.
H1.1: Their willingness to pay for insurance is greater than the expected loss.
H1.2: They prefer the safer option and subscribe to an insurance contract. According
to the theory, unless they perceive the probability as null, individuals will always
decide to insure and have a positive willingness to pay.
H2: Individuals exhibit ambiguity aversion.
H2.1: They are willing to pay a higher premium for a risk with ambiguous probability
(imprecise or conﬂicting) than for a comparable risk with precise probability.
H2.2: They exhibit growing ambiguity aversion. When the ambiguity gets larger, their
willingness to pay for insurance increases.
H3: Individuals behave diﬀerently according to the ambiguity source: they exhibit conﬂict
aversion.
H3.1: They are willing to pay a higher premium for a risk with conﬂicting probabilities
than for a comparable risk with imprecise probability.
H3.2: They prefer a consensual information over a controversial one. They ﬁnd experts
as less trustworthy when they disagree.
3.2 Motivation and survey questions
The survey is based on Kunreuther et al (1993), Cabantous (2007) and Cabantous et al
(2011), but applied to the insurance demand. In these papers, insurers face ambiguous and
extreme event risks. They have to indicate if they are willing to underwrite the risks and, if
they do, what is the minimum pure premium they would accept to underwrite the risk. In
our survey, we ask similar questions to individuals in order to determine the behaviors of
insureds. They have to give the maximum pure premium that they would pay to transfer
the risk to the insurers. The individuals have to imagine an insurance context in which a
risk manager of a big company calls upon two experts in order to determine the true value
of the occurrence probability that a windstorm risk would damage their buildings. The
information given by the experts can take three forms:
• In a risky situation, the occurrence probability can be precisely estimate. The experts
come to a consensus and agree on a unique and precise probability : p
• In an imprecise situation, it is impossible for the experts to narrow the occurrence
probability to a precise estimate. Therefore, the experts agree that the occurrence
probability ranges within an interval : [pmin; pmax]
• In a conﬂicting situation, the experts might not have the same information or hy-
potheses. Therefore, they disagree and each expert gives their own estimate of the
occurrence probability : either pmin or pmax
In addition, the survey tests for growing imprecision and growing conﬂict aversion.
In that sense, subjects are requested to respond to two other questions related to two
other ambiguous situations. In a growing imprecise situation, the experts agree that the
probability range within a larger interval [pmin − k; pmax + k]. In a growing conﬂicting
situation, the experts disagree and each expert gives their own estimate: either pmin − k
or pmax + k.
9
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Table 1: The questions
Questions Information type Occurrence probability
1 Risk
consensual and
precise
1.25%
2 Imprecision
consensual and
imprecise
Between 0.5% and 2%
3 Growing imprecision Between 0.1% and 2.4%
4 Conﬂict
conﬂictual and
precise
0.5% according to an expert,
2% according to another one
5 Growing conﬂict
0.1% according to an expert,
2.4% according to another one
In order to be able to compare the questions, the precise and consensual estimate of
the risky situation (p) is the mean4 of pmin and pmax, and of pmin − k and pmax + k. We
assume that the loss amount estimation is not an issue to the experts (100,000d), hence
the expected loss is always the same (1,250d). Ultimately, the respondents answer ﬁve
questions, which are summarized in Table 1, with the complete summary found in the
Appendix. After each question, they have the possibility to write a comment in order to
explain their choice. These comments will be included in the analysis.
The behaviors under risk and ambiguity can vary depending on the scenario. In addition
to the natural risk of windstorm, questions on an environmental liability risk scenario
based on de Marcellis (2000) were also asked. This scenario introduces a man-made risk
of pollution that could trigger the third-party liability of a company. We used the same
probabilities as in the windstorm risk scenario, but with a higher loss amount (2,000,000d),
thus the expected value is 25,000d. The questionnaire was divided into three parts. One
part contained the windstorm risk scenario and the other part the environmental liability
risk scenario. For both these parts, there were ten questions over all. The last part
asked about the respondents' characteristics (e.g sex, age, job, level of education, income
level, marital status, region of living), insurance (insurance claims in the past three years,
amount, type), and extreme events (past experience concerning windstorm and pollution
risk, perception of the terrorism risk level in their country). The order of the scenarios
and the order of the questions inside each scenario was randomized in order to control for
potential order eﬀect.
3.3 Sampling plan and respondents
The survey was administered, with the assistance of a marketing institute, through a web-
questionnaire. In this way, the experiment took place in a free environment, and individuals
can reveal their preferences without constraints. The subjects were compensated with
points entitling them to vouchers. There were no other incentives expect this ﬂat gain,
but we presume that individuals know how they would behave in situations where they
have the choice, in particular because the questions have a practical orientation through
the insurance context. The survey was completely anonymous, thus the respondents did
not have any proﬁt to disguise their preferences.
4Contrary to Cabantous et al (2011), we use the arithmetic mean and not the geometric mean. In their
paper, they use p equal to 1%, the geometric mean of pmin = 0.5% and pmax = 2%.
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The questionnaires have been sent to individuals in order to have a ﬁnal sample
matching certain characteristics of the French population. The quotas have been calculated
from the 2006 census report of the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE), on sex,
age, regions of France, and socio-economic groups. Experimental papers are usually based
on responses from student subjects who have an economic background and therefore they
give particular attention to the level of probabilities. However, our experiment is based on
a representative sample of the French population. This "real population" does not neces-
sarily have any background in economics or probability, and their responses might not be
the same as students. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 1505 questionnaires. We excluded 33
individuals5 (2.19% of the sample). The analyzed sample of 1472 responses still portrays
the French population6.
4 Results
The literature on insurance decisions suggests that both the insurance decision and the
decision of the insurance premium depend on the risks chracteristics (occurrence probability
and loss amount), the context of the insurance contract, the preferences of individuals,
and socio-demographic factors. However the underlying variables are not the same in both
decisions. Therefore, in our analysis, we separate the insurance decision per se to the
amount of insurance premium, as in the article by Guiso and Jappelli (1998).
4.1 The insurance decision and its determinants
4.1.1 The impact of ambiguity sources on the decision to insure
We focus here on the insurance decision per se, that is whether people buy insurance or
not. Buying insurance is a signal of risk aversion, and refusing insurance reveals a taste
for risk in the sense that the individual is willing to accept the whole consequences of the
event. Table 2 and Table 3 reports respectively the number of refusals for the windstorm
ans the environmental liability risk scenario. The percentage of individuals refusing to
purchase insurance ranges between 25.2% and 31.8% of the sample for the windstorm risk
scenario. The other scenario gives similar results. These results go in the opposite direction
of hypothesis H1.2 which assumed that it was hard to imagine not buying insurance, even
at a low price, considering the large possibility of loss. The refusal to purchase insurance
can be explained by the fact that people are risk lover, or because they underestimate the
occurrence probability of the risk, believing it is null.
Other explanations were found reading the comments7 of the respondents, especially
the fact that people do not feel concerned about the risk so they do not fear it. Further-
more, an important factor of refusing insurance seems to be related to a lack of trust in
the insurance market, and in particular of insurers. Indeed, lots of negative comments
5These are individuals explicitly demanding not to analyze their responses because they did not know
how to answer (4 individuals), or they are individuals willing to pay a premium greater than the highest
possible loss (29 individuals), revealing an obvious misunderstanding or misreading of the questions.
6Of the 1472 respondents, 49% were male and 51% females. The youth (between 18 and 24) represent
14% of the population. The 20-34 and the 35-49 year olds account respectively for 22% and 34% of the
population, the 50-59 for 21% and the 60-65 for 9%.
7In the survey, 30% of the respondents wrote comments that we divided into four qualitative categories:
the one ﬁnding the survey interesting and being enthusiastic, the one giving neutral opinions or suggestions,
the one ﬁnding the survey diﬃcult, and the one criticizing insurance markets.
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reveal that individuals dislike insurance companies and they do not trust the will of in-
surers to pay claims. Some people wrote comments explaining that insurers intentionally
overestimate occurrence probability in order to ask for higher premiums. Other comments
complained about how insurers do not pay back as much as they promised once the risk
occurs. Therefore, the insurance industry seems to be perceived negatively in France.
Moreover, the refusals grow with ambiguity. The percentage of respondents not buying
insurance increases in the imprecise situation and even more in the situation of growing
imprecision for both scenarios. This progression of refusals is even stronger with conﬂict,
and reaches almost one third of the sample with growing conﬂict. Therefore, people seem
to dislike ambiguity in insurance and refuse to insure. They seem to place more credence
on pmin and pmin − k, considering these low estimates as null. Indeed, people are more
willing to trust the expert expressing almost certainty (an estimate close to 0) than the
one expressing more riskyness (Baillon et al, 2011). This is also linked to the problem
of conﬁdence in insurance markets. People prefer taking the risk thinking the probability
is null, rather than purchasing insurance and trusting experts who may be wrong. This
rejection of experts' estimates is greater in conﬂict than in imprecision, which conﬁrms
hypothesis H3.2 that people prefer consensual information and tend to avoid conﬂicts.
4.1.2 The impact of observable characteristics on the decision to insure
Observable characteristics inﬂuence the decision to insure. When running independence
tests (chi2 tests), several variables appear to be signiﬁcant. The individuals refusing insu-
rance are mostly the youth. Between 18 and 25 years old, 30% do not buy insurance in
comparison to 19% for the more than 50. The number of refusals are higher for the lower
socio-economic groups8, those persons with little or no level of higher education, those with
low incomes and bachelors. Furthermore, more people are willing to insure if they have
claimed on insurance damage within the last three years, and if they or their neighbours
have experienced a windstorm event in the past. Finally, the majority of the respondents
that criticized the insurers would not buy insurance.
In Table 4 of Appendix B, we report the Probit estimates of the binary decision of
buying insurance or not for the windstorm risk scenario9 with the marginal eﬀects on each
variable. The probability of buying insurance positively depends on age and on education
level. Being between 25 and 49 years old, in comparison with the youngest, increases the
probability to insure by 23%. Being older than 50 increases the probability to insure by
32%. In terms of marginal eﬀect, the predicted probability of buying insurance is 7% for
the 25-49 and 9% for people older than 50. In addition, having a higher degree (Masters
degree or Ph.D.) increases the probability of purchasing insurance by 30% in comparison
to having no degree. People with higher education are more willing to insure than people
with less education. One could think that it is related to the level of income, however
income is not a signiﬁcant variable in the insurance decision. According to Kunreuther
(1984), refusing insurance cannot be explained by income, but by the deny of the expo-
sure to catastrophe. In this way, the Probit estimates show that past experience10 with
windstorms have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the demand for insurance. In addition,
8The socio economic groups can be divided into two main groups: an upper group that is supposed to
have a high purchasing power, and a lower group with poor purchasing power.
9The Probit estimates of the environmental liability risk scenario are not presented as the results were
similar but less signiﬁcant than the ones of the windstorm risk scenario.
10The fact that the respondent or its neighbours and family have experienced a risk of windstorm.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the windstorm risk scenario
Risk Imprecision
Growing
imprecision
Conﬂict
Growing
conﬂict
Nb of refusals 377 386 422 404 468
% of refusals 25.5% 26.2% 28.7% 27.4% 31.8%
Mean premium(d) 1 920 1 632 1 846 1 763 1 709
Mean/EL 1.54 1.31 1.48 1.41 1.37
Note: EL means Expected Loss, deﬁned as the average probability multiplied by the total loss amount:
EL=1 250d, 1.25% chance of losing 100,000d.
Table 3: Summary statistics of the environmental liability risk scenario
Risk Imprecision
Growing
imprecision
Conﬂict
Growing
conﬂict
Nb of refusals 325 330 374 331 437
% of refusals 22.1% 22.4% 25.4% 22.5% 29.7%
Mean premium(d) 14 625 14 726 15 374 14 176 13 517
Mean/EL 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.57 0.54
Note: EL=25,000d: 1.25% chance of losing 2,000,000d.
the people that claimed on insurance damage within the last three years are also more
willing to buy insurance. These variables are related to the regions of France, the north
being more impacted by windstorms than the south. Then, the demand for insurance is
higher for residents in this part of France. Finally, the perception of the terrorism risk is a
signiﬁcant factor on the insurance decision. This variable should not have a great impact
as it is related to the formation of beliefs and not to information processing.
To summarize, it is possible to ﬁnd a set of characteristic variables that helps to un-
derstand the insurance decision. That decision is not only an arbitrage toward the risk
speciﬁcities. Refusing insurance reveals a lack of conﬁdence in the French insurance in-
dustry, a result that might not be the same in other countries where the risk culture is
diﬀerent. The socio-economic characteristics (age, level of education), as well as the expe-
rience in terms of insurance and extreme risk events, signiﬁcantly impact the decision to
insure. However, we will see in the next section that the factors are not the same for the
willingness to pay, which seems to be a heterogeneous decision.
4.2 The insurance willingness to pay and its determinants
4.2.1 People behave diﬀerently in practice compared to theory
We focus here on the willingness to pay for insurance, i.e. on insurance amounts people are
willing to pay for insuring against speciﬁc risks, and in particular on the behaviors in the
windstorm risk scenario11. Table 2 reports the means of premium and of normalized pre-
mium of the respondents buying insurance12. A normalized premium equal to one denotes
11As we will see later, the results of the windstorm risk scenario are more robust and more signiﬁcant
than the ones in the environmental liability scenario
12These premiums are calculated based on the respondents buying insurance, then the samples are not
exactly the same. However, taking the same sample reduce the number of observations and produces
exactly the same results.
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an insurance premium equal to the expected loss, and then a risk neutral attitude. We see
that premiums are signiﬁcantly higher than the expected loss for the ﬁve questions. This
fact corroborates hypothesis H1.1 that people exhibit risk aversion. The premium distri-
bution shows a strong asymmetry to the left, the skewness being on average around 6.20.
Almost 70% of the population buying insurance is willing to pay a premium lower than
1,000d, i.e. 0.8 in terms of expected loss. This taste for risk of certain respondents might
be the consequence of misunderstanding risk characteristics or the importance of other
factors. People do not only take a decision based on probability. Indeed, some people have
indicated in the comments that they are not familiar with probabilities. Previous studies
have been conducted on student subjects who had greater familiarity with probability.
The results show that the mean premium with precise information is always greater
than the one with imprecise or conﬂicting information. Student tests13 conﬁrm that these
results are robust. Therefore, H2.1 is rejected because people exhibit ambiguity seeking
behaviors: they are willing to pay a higher price in situation of risk than in situation of
ambiguity. This ﬁnding does not go in the sense of the usual literature supposing am-
biguity aversion in low probability losses. However, the popular hypothesis of ambiguity
aversion has met some mixed validations. Several empirical evidences suggest that am-
biguity preference in low probability losses exists (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Cohen et
al, 1987; Dobbs, 1991; Kuhn, 1997; Ho et al, 2002; Chakravarty and Roy, 2009; Wakker,
2010, on page 354; ...). Therefore, it is not clear yet how people respond to ambiguity in
losses. In particular, Sarin and Weber (1993) study the eﬀect of ambiguity on the price in
market experiments, and ﬁnd that the price for ambiguous assets is lower than the price
for unambiguous assets. They explain it by the fact that subjects consider an ambiguous
assets as inferior, and thus they are willing to pay less for it. Within an insurance context,
Wakker et al (2007) ﬁnd ambiguity seeking in the willingness to take insurance, because
people prefer the more familiar option and that normal decisions are made without extra
statistical information.
The context of growing ambiguity lead to diﬀerent results. Regarding the attitudes
toward imprecision, the mean premium increases in the situation of growing imprecision.
People are willing to pay a higher price when the interval of probability gets larger14. There-
fore, they exhibit growing imprecision aversion, which conﬁrms hypothesis H2.2. However,
regarding the attitudes toward conﬂict, the mean premium in situation of conﬂict is higher
than the one in situation of growing conﬂict. Therefore, people exhibit a certain taste for
growing conﬂict15. The two situations of conﬂict have been clearly seen as diﬀerent, given
the number of refusals (see previous section). Hypothesis H3 suggests that the attitudes
toward imprecision and conﬂict are diﬀerent. The results show that the mean premium
with imprecise information is signiﬁcantly lower than the one with conﬂicting information.
Thus, hypothesis H3.1 is conﬁrmed. However, the opposite is true between growing impre-
cision and growing conﬂict even if the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. The weight
given to the lowest estimate is higher in a situation of growing conﬂict than in a situation of
growing imprecision (Baillon et al, 2011). People behave in diﬀerent ways in the presence
of conﬂict and imprecision. The diﬀerences between the ﬁve questions are robust within
the sample. We tested several subgroups with speciﬁc characteristics to determine if one
13The p-values of the t-tests on the diﬀerences between risk and imprecision or conﬂict are null.
14The p-value of the t-test on the diﬀerence between imprecision and growing imprecision is 0.062.
15However, the Student test on the mean diﬀerence between conﬂict and growing conﬂict is not signiﬁcant
(p-value of 0.135), but the test on the median diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.007).
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subgroup had completed the whole set of hypotheses cited in section 3.1. We found similar
results within each group.
Concerning the environmental liability scenario, the results are very diﬀerent (see
Table 3). Surprisingly, the mean premiums are always lower than the expected loss: people
exhibit a taste for risk. Nearly 90% of the sample are willing to pay a premium lower than
the expected loss. The rank of the questions are almost the same as for the windstorm
risk scenario, except that the mean premium under risk is on the same level as the mean
premium of the other questions. The premium distribution is much smoother, and the dif-
ferences between the questions are not as signiﬁcant16. Kunreuther et al (1993) underline
the fact that the premiums are diﬀerent depending on the scenario. The diﬀerences can
be explained by a misunderstanding of the scenario. People face diﬃculties to assess a risk
with a total loss amount of 2 billion euros. Furthermore, they cannot easily imagine an en-
vironmental risk, which is less common and more speciﬁc to companies. A windstorm risk
is much easier to imagine. Finally, it may have behavioral diﬀerences between a natural
risk of catastrophe and a man-made risk of pollution.
4.2.2 The impact of observable characteristics on the willingness to pay
The insurance premium decision seems to be correlated to observable characteristics, accor-
ding to independence tests (chi2) and analyses of variance (ANOVA). Especially, women
are willing to pay on average a premium 25% higher than men. The premiums are also
higher for the youth (less than 25 years old), the low socio-economic groups and the low
incomes. In addition, individuals feeling the terrorism risk at a high level are willing to pay
on average 2,400d (1.9 in terms of expected loss); and the ones feeling that the terrorism
risk is very low are willing to pay on average 1,000d (0.8 in terms of expected loss). Re-
garding comments, the respondent criticizing insurance markets are willing to pay a very
low premium (on average 220d, i.e. 0.18 in terms of expected loss).
Due to the censoring of the variable (refusals of insurance being premiums equal to 0),
we ran a Tobit17 model on the whole insurance demand decision. However, the sign pattern
and statistical signiﬁcance do not match those of the probit model. Only two characteristics
have a signiﬁcant and positive inﬂuence on insurance demand on the whole: the fact that
people have reported an insurance claims within the last three years, and the level of
perception of terrorism risk. With only two signiﬁcant variables, the insurance demand
cannot be explained by observable characteristics. However, the Tobil model is an ordered
regression and does not represent bimodality. Indeed, there could be a bimodality for a
certain number of individuals18. Other models are needed to translate this possible eﬀect.
Nevertheless, it is not possible to ﬁnd a set of signiﬁcant variables explaining the level
of insurance premium. Within an insurance context, there seems to be several attitudes
toward risk, imprecision and conﬂict.
16The Student tests show weaker diﬀerences between the questions.
17The results of the Tobit model are not presented in this paper due to their poor signiﬁcance.
18The people refusing insurance and the people demanding the highest premiums seem to have similar
characteristics (youth, low socio-economic group, low income).
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4.3 General discussion
4.3.1 The insurance demand diﬀers according to the information type
This paper separates the decision to insure and the level of the willingness to pay. In the
decision to insure, one third of the population are willing to take the consequences of a
low-probability event and does not buy insurance. This decision can be explained by the
respondents observable characteristics and by a lack of conﬁdence in the insurance indus-
try. In the decision of the insurance premium, people exhibit risk aversion (Kunreuther,
1978; McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey, 1993) and ambiguity seeking behaviors (Sarin
and Weber, 1993; Wakker et al, 2007). In addition, the attitudes toward imprecision and
conﬂict are diﬀerent. They pay a higher premium in the situation where experts disagree,
however fewer people are willing to insure. People exhibit conﬂict aversion, they prefer
consensual information and deeply dislike conﬂicting one.
Smithson (1999) and Cabantous et al (2011) explain that people attribute imprecision
to the task diﬃculty and conﬂict to the incompetence of the experts. The diﬀerences
between these two ambiguity sources can come from the unknown and unknowable in-
formations of Chow and Sarin (2002)19. Here, imprecision is related to the unknowable
information and conﬂict to the unknown information. Chow and Sarin (2002) ﬁnd that
people prefer when probabilities are precise (known information) and they feel insecure
when they are ambiguous (unknown information), because they think someone else pos-
sesses the information. This feeling of relative ignorance can be found in the higher number
of refusals in the presence of conﬂict. Furthermore, they prefer unknowable information
over unknown information. According to them, uncertainty is more acceptable when the
information is not available at all. In this sense, it can explain why people prefer imprecise
information (unknowable) over conﬂicting one (unknown). Meanwhile, a known informa-
tion is always preferred. That is why people are willing to pay a higher premium under
risk. They consider ambiguous situations as being inferior (Sarin and Weber, 1993).
With controversial information, people think that the disagreement is due to the ex-
pert's incompetence, or to the insurer's will to increase premiums (linked to the negative
perception of insurance in France). The competence of an expert is related to their credibil-
ity. In the questionnaire, respondents had no information that could allow to diﬀerentiate
the experts. Even in real life, the reliability of expert opinion is diﬃcult to assess and deci-
sions contain subjectivity. The behaviors and choices depend on the perceived reliability of
the available information. This perception can change when conﬂict grows. Therefore, the
expert almost claiming certainty (an occurrence probability almost equal to zero) could be
preferred and overweighted in the decision (Baillon et al, 2011).
4.3.2 The insurance demand varies depending on the context
The results reveal diﬀerent attitudes according to the scenario. Respondents are willing
to pay greater premium than the expected loss facing a windstorm risk, but a much lower
one facing an environmental risk. Kahn and Sarin (1988) report that the context causes
subjects in a consumer choice experiment to switch from being ambiguity averse to am-
biguity seeking. For insurers, the type of peril also seems to aﬀect the decision. Insurers
19Chow and Sarin (2002) diﬀerentiate known, unknown and unknowable information. Known informa-
tion refers to a precise situation. Unknown information refers to an ambiguous situation for which other
people might have the missing information. Unknowable information refers to an ambiguous situation in
which nobody knows the true value of the missing information.
16
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.20
charge higher premiums for earthquake and hurricane risks than for pollution and ﬁre risks
(Cabantous, 2007; Cabantous et al, 2011). In our results, the diﬀerences can be linked to
behavioral diﬀerences due to the peril type (natural risk versus man-made risk), and/or to
the larger total loss amount of the environmental risk that has been underestimated.
In the comments, some individuals explicitly wrote that they will never face the envi-
ronmental liability risk. Indeed, the risk of pollution is mostly relevant to companies. The
scenario is highly hypothetical for individuals, and therefore individuals were requested to
act in the capacity of a company. In this way, they do not only reason based on their
own possible risks. Moreover, the problem of competence is much deeper, as comments
reveal that they do not want to take the responsibility for that kind of decision. They
prefer government intervention in case of extreme risks. Thinking about extreme risks is
diﬃcult and believing the consequences takes a cognitive eﬀort. Appreciating such biases
and reducing them through prevention and communication, is an important step.
4.3.3 The insurance demand is inﬂuenced by other factors
People do not only reason based on the risk characteristics. The general public constituent
our sample does not necessarily understand probabilities and high amounts of losses. Some
admit in the comments of not having any background in mathematics. People cannot al-
ways make an explicit trade-oﬀ between the expected beneﬁts of buying insurance and
the possible costs of taking the risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). Furthermore, the
presence of ambiguity makes it more diﬃcult to arbitrate, leading to either overestimating
or ignoring small probabilities (Kunreuther et al, 2001). People face diﬃculties assessing
an equivalence between ambiguous and non-ambiguous probabilities, or believing a very
large amount of loss. The available information is misunderstood.
Behaviors are aﬀected by risk perception, itself distorted by cognitive biases and emo-
tional factors such as pessimism and myopia. Especially, the level of perception of the
terrorism risk is always a signiﬁcant variable. However, it is related to the formation of
beliefs and not to the objective analysis of the available information. This variable repre-
sents, in our survey, a proxy for pessimism and thus ambiguity aversion. Indeed, it depicts
a constant psychological trait on diﬀerent decisions. Furthermore, past experience con-
cerning the risk is also a signiﬁcant variable, in particular to the decision to insure. People
often purchase insurance following a disaster. They do not think that the best return on
an insurance policy is no return at all. Most individuals consider that the event will simply
not happen to them. It is a psychological bias toward short-term maximization instead
of long-term planning (myopia). In addition, in France, catastrophe coverage is usually
automatically included in a comprehensive home insurance contract (without even people
knowing about it); and the government helps in case of major event. Then, the status quo
is not changing its insurance coverage. Therefore, insurance decisions represent a balance
between intuition and more deliberate analysis.
The insurers' reputation appears to be an important factor of the insurance decision.
Comments reveal a lack of trust in the insurance industry. People do not insure because
they think that the insurers will not reimburse them in case of a loss event. However,
this belief seems false. Indeed, the results also show that more people buy insurance when
they have reported insurance claims than when they have not. The people dealing with
insurance are more willing to insure and to buy insurance at higher premiums. Therefore,
there seems to be a diﬃculty to trust insurers before experiencing an insured loss.
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5 Conclusion
Of particular interest here is whether the insurance decision is fundamentally diﬀerent for
precise, imprecise and controversial extreme events, and whether it is possible to ﬁnd some
determinants of insurance demand through a survey administered to a large representative
sample of the French population. Our results provide the evidence that individuals as
non-sophisticated subjects of the insurance markets behave in ways that do not go in the
sense of decision theory. Two decisions are diﬀerentiated: the insurance decision per se
and the willingness to pay. On the one hand, almost one third of the population is not
ready to take insurance and that decision is impacted by the socio-demographic characte-
ristics of the respondents and by the degree of trust they have in the insurance industry.
On the other hand, the individuals asking for insurance exhibit risk aversion and ambi-
guity seeking behaviors. In situations of risk, individuals feel comfortable and trust the
experts. In situations of ambiguity, they raise doubts because of the diﬃculty to assess
low probability events or to trust experts that might be wrong. They consider ambiguous
situations as inferior and are not willing to pay so much for them. Furthermore they ex-
hibit conﬂict aversion and always prefer a consensual information in which the information
is unknowable. They dislike controversial situations because they feel insecure in trusting
one expert over the other. Then, the risk characteristics, the information type, the context,
the beliefs and the personal characteristics aﬀect the decision-making process of insurance
demand.
On the demand side, people exhibit risk aversion, they are willing to pay a higher
premium than the expected loss, but the premium they are willing to pay decreases in
situations of ambiguity (imprecision and conﬂict). However, on the supply side, previous
studies have shown that insurers are slightly risk averse but strongly increase the pre-
miums in situations of ambiguity (Cabantous, 2007; Cabantous et al, 2011). In a free
market, supply has to meet demand. Therefore, an insurance market for extreme events,
where the risk characteristics are precise, can exist, but it seems that there is no possi-
bility for a free market for extreme events where the risk characteristics are ambiguous.
In that sense, Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) reveal that sellers of insurance exhibit more
ambiguity aversion than buyers of insurance. Indeed, the agent who supports the risk gives
more attention to loss amounts because a misunderstanding of the probabilities can lead
to severe consequences. Furthermore, the buyer always wants the lowest price and is more
ready to trust the lowest estimates. In order to have a market for extreme and ambiguous
risks, it is important that insureds and insurers have similar view of the risk characteristics.
Therefore, communication on the risks has to be improved. An alternative solution is that
of government intervention, through public-private partnerships or by making insurance
for extreme risks compulsory.
These results point to a panel of recommendations concerning the communication of
insurance companies. The ﬁrst of them would be for insurers not to communicate in the
same manner according to the risks and to the available information. Insurance companies
should provide both qualitative and quantitative information. In order to avoid a priori
judgements on certain risks and to encourage people to buy insurance, it would be use-
ful to present the risks as being of personal concern to the potential buyers. Indeed, the
results show a strong diﬀerence in the way in which individuals manage catastrophic and
man-made events. People think they can handle their own attitude towards risk. Another
recommendation deals with the reputation of insurance companies - an issue that has to be
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taken seriously. In the comments, respondents wrote that insurers manipulate data. Insu-
rers should thus be very transparent in their communication, and straightforward in what
regards premiums. The products should be presented in a realistic way. Consumers tend
to prefer an imprecise piece of information when experts openly deﬁne it as unknowable.
They do not want insurers to lie to them or to overload them with information. There-
fore, it is important to recognize that there are uncertainties surrounding extreme risks.
Furthermore, the reputation of insurance companies seems to improve once people have
actually dealt with insurers. It is then essential to develop and secure the loyalty of the
clients. It could hence be interesting to consider the way in which people think of insu-
rers according to whether the insurance claims have been paid or have only been reported
without having given right to a refund.
A limitation of this survey could be that the questions asked are abstract; connected to
rare events and hypothetical situations. Nevertheless, this survey is part of a global project
on decision making. We are currently running surveys dedicated to insurance professionals
(insurers and reinsurers), in order to have a global assessment of the insurance market for
extreme and ambiguous event risks. The project will provide insights on behaviors in the
insurance markets.
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Appendix A: Survey on insurance demand
Short instructions before starting: First of all thank you for participating to this
survey dealing with understanding insurance behaviors. It consists in a scientiﬁc study
about the decision making process of individuals working in insurance. This research is
sponsored by the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and will provide support for a PhD
in Economics. Completing this survey will take between 12 and 15 minutes depending on
your answers. The objective is to analyze how individuals make decisions in situations of
risk that may be encountered in professional life. You should consider the hypothetical
situations as real life situations. Some situations presented may seem extreme or unreal-
istic. What is interesting is your decision given the situation. There is no right or wrong
answer. This survey is completely anonymous. The survey results will be published in a
consolidated form only. If you wish to receive them once it is completed, you can leave your
email address. Please read the instructions carefully and answer as honestly as possible.
Thank you in advance for your participation.
Functioning of insurance: The policyholder transfers a risk (random by deﬁnition)
to the insurance company. The insurance company accepts the risk in exchange for an
insurance premium. The policyholder is then protected against covered events that he/she
does not want to support solely. The insurance mechanism does not modify the occur-
rence probability of the risk and its consequences. The insurance company realizes a risk
mutualization between the insureds through the underwriting of numerous similar risks.
This risk management allows the insurer to pay oﬀ all the disasters which the insureds will
undergo using the premiums paid upfront.
Your role: You are the Head of Risk Management in a large company which owns several
buildings. You are in charge of deﬁning insurance contracts that you are willing to buy in
order to protect the company against some particular risks. In other words, you choose the
insurance coverage against losses linked to potential risks. The purpose is here to analyze
the risks of the diﬀerent buildings in order to cover them separately. Two types of risks
can exist: A windstorm risk and an environmental liability risk.
Two risk characteristics:
• The total loss amount : In case of a windstorm risk, it includes direct insured losses
(destruction of buildings, contents) and business interruption following the disaster,
estimated from the turnover of the company, net deductibles. In case of an environ-
mental liability risk, the total losses amount includes the material and immaterial
damages caused to third parties and the clean-up costs.
• The annual occurrence probability of a risk: X% (i.e. 1 every Y years in average).
Experts' opinion: In order to have a more accurate vision of the risk, you have engaged
two experts. Based on the company business and on modeling software, they estimate
the annual occurrence probability of the risk (windstorm or environmental liability). The
assessment of the loss amount does not cause any trouble to the experts. Three cases can
come out:
• The experts are in agreement, they have a precise idea of the risk and give a unique
probability.
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• The experts are in agreement, but they face diﬃculties in estimating precisely the
risk and give an inaccurate estimate of the probability.
• The experts disagree on the estimate, and each expert gives their own probability.
Your mission: For each outlined situation, as Head of Risk Management in a large com-
pany, you will have to determine the maximum amount of the insurance premium that you
are willing to pay in order to cover a risk entirely. The insurance will guarantee you an
integral reimbursement in case of a risk. However, you will always have the possibility of
refusing to take insurance. In that case, your company will bear the entire loss in case of
a risk occurrence. After each answer, you may write a comment. For example, you can
explain how you have settled the premium amount, why you have refused to cover the risk,
or under which conditions you would change your mind.
Windstorm risk scenario: In this list of 5 questions, your company is looking for insur-
ing against the windstorm risk. Your company owns several buildings spread in diﬀerent
areas. The risk intensity can vary depending on the vulnerability, the exposure, the safety
measures, etc.
1 - Question with risk: Your experts agree on a unique probability. They estimate that
the occurrence probability of a windstorm is 1.25% (i.e. 1 event every 80 years). The total
loss amount for the event would be 100,000d. What is the maximum insurance premium
that you are willing to pay in order to protect yourself against this risk during one year
(write 0d if you refuse to take insurance)? Do you have any comments?
2 - Question with imprecision: Your experts agree on an interval for the probability.
They estimate that the occurrence probability of a windstorm is between 0.5% (i.e. 1 event
every 200 years) and 2% (i.e. 1 event every 50 years). The total loss amount for the event
would be 100,000d. What is the maximum insurance premium that you are willing to pay
in order to protect yourself against this risk during one year (write 0d if you refuse to
take insurance)? Do you have any comments?
3 - Question with growing imprecision: Your experts agree on an interval for the pro-
bability. They estimate that the occurrence probability of a windstorm is between 0.1%
(i.e. 1 event every 1,000 years) and 2.4% (i.e. 1 event every 42 years). The total loss
amount for the event would be 100,000d. What is the maximum insurance premium that
you are willing to pay in order to protect yourself against this risk during one year (write
0d if you refuse to take insurance)? Do you have any comments?
4 - Question with conﬂict: Your experts disagree on the probability and they provide
two diﬀerent estimations of the probability. One expert estimates that the occurrence pro-
bability of a windstorm is 0.5% (i.e. 1 event every 200 years), the other expert estimates
that it is 2% (i.e. 1 event every 50 years). The total loss amount for the event would
be 100,000d. What is the maximum insurance premium that you are willing to pay in
order to protect yourself against this risk during one year (write 0d if you refuse to take
insurance)? Do you have any comments?
5 - Question with growing conﬂict: Your experts disagree on the probability and they
provide two diﬀerent estimates of the probability. One expert estimates that the occur-
rence probability of a windstorm is 0.1% (i.e. 1 event every 1,000 years), the other expert
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estimates that it is 2.4% (i.e. 1 event every 42 years). The total loss amount for the event
would be 100,000d. What is the maximum insurance premium that you are willing to pay
in order to protect yourself against this risk during one year (write 0d if you refuse to
take insurance)? Do you have any comments?
Environmental liability risk scenario: In this list of ﬁve questions, your company uses
toxic chemical products in the production process and is looking for insurance against the
environmental liability risk. Your company owns several buildings and respects the legal
norms concerning dangerous product use. However, there is a risk that a leak breaks out
and toxic products pollute the neighbourhood soil.
Questions: The same ﬁve questions as in the windstorm risk scenario, but with a total
loss amount of 2 billiond.
Other questions:
Socio-demographic questions: sex, birth date, region of living, marital status, number
of children, socio-economic group, income level.
Insurance questions:
• Did you report a claim to your insurance company during the last 3 years?
• What was the type of risk?
• What was the approximate cost of the claim?
Extreme event questions:
• Have you, or one of your relatives or friends, suﬀered losses due to a windstorm?
• Do you think it has changed your perception on windstorm insurance?
• Have you, or one of your relatives or friends, suﬀered losses due to an environmental
pollution caused by a company?
• Do you think it has changed your perception on environmental liability insurance?
• How high do you consider the risk of terrorism is in your country ?
Suggestions: Do you have suggestions or comments about this survey? If you want to
receive the survey results, please indicate your email address.
22
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.20
Appendix B: Probit analysis
Table 4: The eﬀects of socio-demographic characteristics on the insurance decision
in the windstorm risk scenario: Probit estimates
Coeﬃcient t-stat P > |t| Marginal
probability(%)
Sexe (F → M) -0.025 -0.30 0,767 -0.689
Age (<25 years old)
25-49 years old 0.231* 1.77 0.076 7.054
>50 years old 0.317** 2.12 0.034 9.396
Socio-economic group (Low)
High 0.069 0.71 0.475 1.953
Degree (No education)
A-level 0.075 0.66 0.509 2.240
Bachelor degree 0.168 1.52 0.130 4.880
Master degree or Ph.D. 0.298** 2.06 0.040 8.247
Income level (Low: <1600d)
Medium: 1600d- 7600d 0.107 1.05 0.296 3.087
High: >7600d 0.174 0.98 0.328 4.905
Marital status (Bachelor)
Common life 0.014 0.11 0.911 0.395
Married -0.044 -0.34 0.731 -1.273
Separated or divorced 0.196 1.11 0.269 5.115
Number of children (0)
1 0.039 0.32 0.748 1.052
2 and more -0.088 -0.82 0.412 -2.500
Region of France (South-West)
South-East 0.222 1.59 0.113 6.685
Ile de France (region of Paris) 0.143 0.96 0.338 4.420
North-West 0.290** 2.06 0.040 8.525
North-East 0.256* 1.81 0.070 7.613
Insurance claim 0.266*** 2.72 0.006 7.502
Experience in windstorm risk 0.271*** 2.63 0.009 7.621
Experience in environmental risk -0.237 -1.07 0.284 -6.665
Perception of the level of terrorism 0.151* 1.88 0.060 4.248
Constant -0.516 -1.48 0.139
R2 0.0384
Note: Marginal probabilities refer to the probability of buying insurance. It gives the predicted probability
at each level of the observable characteristics, holding all other variables in the model at their means.
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